{"id":45,"date":"2026-02-03T14:38:13","date_gmt":"2026-02-03T14:38:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/imex.ifzg.hr\/?page_id=45"},"modified":"2026-02-03T14:44:49","modified_gmt":"2026-02-03T14:44:49","slug":"about_the_project","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/imex.ifzg.hr\/index.php\/about_the_project\/","title":{"rendered":"About the project"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Intentionality and Modes of Existence<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Historical Framework<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If one would have to name a single concept peculiar to contemporary theoretical philosophy, intentionality<\/em> would be a good, if not the best, choice. Despite looming large (typically under the label \u2018representation\u2019) in many other disciplines and fields of study \u2013 from psychology and linguistics to anthropology, sociology, and cognitive science, it remains a philosophical concept par excellence<\/em>. The fundamental problem it encloses \u2013 relatedness of thoughts or language items to its objects (however these may be identified) \u2013 is traceable to ancient philosophy from where it had been picked up and explicitly addressed by the scholastic thinkers. The latter, who also take credit for introducing \u2018intentio\u2019 as a philosophical terminus technicus<\/em>, were primarily interested in the complex ways different classes of concepts acquire their meaning. It is often claimed that it was Franz Brentano who had revived this interest by identifying intentionality as the distinctive feature of all mental phenomena and therefore worthy of becoming an autonomous field of enquiry. Notwithstanding the historical accuracy of this account, it should be relativized in light of the fact that the notion of intentionality is already implicit in the work of almost all important post-Cartesian thinkers \u2013 from Leibniz and Hobbes to Hume and Kant. What Brentano, however, drew attention to by his cryptic formulations (\u201cintentional inexistence\u201d, \u201creference to a content\u201d, \u201cdirection towards an object\u201d) are the underlying ontological issues. Two questions are immediately discernible: (1) the metaphysical status of states capable of intentionality (i.e. mental states), and (2) the metaphysical status of objects (\u201cintentional objects\u201d) \u201cexisting in\u201d, or coming to existence through, such states (or its corresponding linguistic expressions).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Answering the first question became the principal goal of the philosophy of mind, the second one being peculiar to philosophy of language and philosophy of logic. In fact, the development of analytic philosophy in the 20th<\/sup> century, even before the mentioned disciplines had been able to branch off from its stem, was decisively influenced by efforts of philosophers (from Frege, Russel, and Wittgenstein to Ryle, Quine, and Chisolm) to cope with the two cited puzzles. On the other side, phenomenology, the philosophical movement inaugurated by Brentano himself and then fundamentally reshaped by Husserl, took intentionality as its principal subject matter, pursuing meticulous descriptive analyses of its various manifestations. Although phenomenology is typically regarded as being indifferent towards ontological issues \u2013 due to its rigorous methodological stance (demanding radical \u201cbracketing\u201d of all questions regarding the \u201creal existence\u201d of extramental objects) \u2013 it would be more accurate to say that it aspires to study the modes of existence of intentional objects qua<\/em> intentional.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Notwithstanding the all too obvious differences in their approaches and philosophical agendas, if there is a single insight shared by thinkers belonging to the two mentioned traditions of the 20th<\/sup> century philosophy it is that the two concepts, intentionality and existence, are mutually dependant on each other, and that this dependency manifests itself at multiple levels generating a host of interesting philosophical problems. Of course, since the decline of phenomenology by the mid 20th<\/sup> century, the dominant metaphysical framework for studying intentionality and existence has been the physicalistic or, at least, the naturalistic one. Hence, the underlying motivation of authors working within this framework remained unchanged since the first formulation of the psychophysical identity theory or the early days of the AI inspired functionalism \u2013 that is, the inclusion of intentional phenomena into the project of naturalization of the mind. One should, however, not overlook those valuable contributions to the subject matter of intentionality and existence that lie outside the physicalistic\/naturalistic framework or are indeed fully incompatible with its basic metaphysical presuppositions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Research Topics and Goals. <\/strong>To raise the question of existence primarily means to clarify our pre-theoretical beliefs about what exists, what doesn\u2019t, and what it means to say or think that something does or does not exist. People strongly disagree on these matters, their disagreements often having practical consequences. Even though they cannot all be right, they can obviously all think and talk about existence and non-existence \u2013 either of individual things, their properties, relations, states of affairs etc. or the respective types or classes of such things. It is enough to acknowledge this fact to already be confronted with the puzzle of intentionality \u2013 a peculiar feature of our thoughts and words to be about something, be directed towards something, or representing something, even when the latter does not seem to exist, i.e. when it is merely intended<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With respect to this general framework, the main goal of the proposed project, entitled \u201cIntentionality and the Modes of Existence\u201d, is to explore the selected aspects of the relation between intentionality and existence, both from the historical and the contemporary perspectives, paying special attention to the interdependence of the two, and to draw conclusions concerning this interdependence based on the investigation of its specific aspects (as research segments of the project). Different perspectives assume not only different approaches but also involve different philosophical disciplines, both traditional and contemporary \u2013 from metaphysics, epistemology, and logic, to philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. Although the project is primarily focused on contemporary contributions to the subject matter, important historical achievements are also included in the research agenda (including those of Croatian authors).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The project is designed to cover four mutually interconnected research topics each corresponding, but not being strictly reduced to, the designated disciplines of theoretical philosophy: (1) Philosophy of Religion: Intentionality of Abstract Entities from a Theistic Perspective [Davor Pe\u0107njak]; (2) Philosophy of Mind: Relation Between Consciousness, Intentionality, and Reality in the Contemporary Debates on the Nature of Mind [Ljudevit Han\u017eek, Dario \u0160karica, Tomislav Janovi\u0107]; (3) Logic and Philosophy of Language: Intentionality of Formal and Applied Logics [Ivan Restovi\u0107, Gabriela Ba\u0161i\u0107 Han\u017eek]; (4) History of Philosophy: Realist Conception of Propositional Content in the Early Analytic Philosophy [Du\u0161an Do\u017eudi\u0107, postdoctoral researcher].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the following, the detailed description of the prospective contributions to these four topics is given. Topics (2) and (3) include subtopics as separate but integrated research segments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Topic 1: Intentionality of Abstract Entities from a Theistic Perspective.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Intentionality and existence are closely connected in ways that are worthy of examining from a theistic perspective. In fact, many philosophers of religion and theologians have taken this task upon themselves. (Davies 2001; Lestow, 1990, 2006; McCann 2012) At least traditionally, God is conceived as existing necessarily and as a being capable of completely determining the existence of all other beings in the world. That is, God is the supreme, maximally excellent being and creator of all entities, these other entities being thus dependent on Him in a double sense \u2013 for their coming to existence and for their remaining in existence. On the other hand, the existence of abstract entities \u2013 e.g. mathematical objects like numbers, functions, sets etc. \u2013 are typically conceived as independent of any subject that can think about them; they are outside space and time. That is, their inherent properties, at least prima facie, should be sufficient for their existence, making them independent of any other being, including God. If this thesis, which is obviously in conflict with classical theism, is sound, it is hard to see how the conclusion can be avoided that there are entities over which God does not have control or creative\/destructive powers \u2013 entities independent from an all-powerful being.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, if classic theism is to be rescued one would have to show how the existence of such abstract and necessary entities is to be reconciled with the existence of God. Several different solutions to the puzzle have been proposed in contemporary theistic metaphysics (Gould 2014), each of them having its virtues and drawbacks. The most obvious solution is nominalism (Craig 2014, 2017) which denies the existence of abstract entities in the first place. For nominalism, therefore, the problem of reconciling God\u2019s existence with the existence of abstract entities does not arise. An alternative would be a modified theistic activism (Gould and Davis 2014), according to which the so-called abstract objects like concepts and propositions are products of God\u2019s intellectual activity. Still another solution is a version of theistic Platonism (Yandell 2014) which assents to the independent existence of abstract entities. Being uncreated, such entities thus pose no further problem since, being also abstract, they are causally inert, cannot cause anything. Finally, there is the theistic conceptualism (Welty 2014) according to which abstract entities are indeed uncreated but exist as constituents of God\u2019s mind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After showing why neither of these solutions work, a new solution will be proposed and defended. This solution is a variant of constructivism (intuitionism) regarding God\u2019s ability to create abstract entities such as mathematical objects and propositions. As to mathematical entities, constructivism requires definite procedures for their creation; so, if such procedures can be envisaged, the existence of mathematical entities is guaranteed. For constructivists, these procedures are conceived and performed in consciousness. Since God, as a personal<\/em> being, satisfies the consciousness requirement by definition and is thus capable of performing the mentioned procedures, it remains to be shown how God can construct mathematical entities. What complicate matters is that there are two possible interpretations of God\u2019s eternal existence \u2013 temporal and atemporal \u2013 which require separate treatment regarding the construction of mathematical entities. If God\u2019s existence is atemporally eternal, then God has procedures for instantly constructing mathematical entities; if God\u2019s existence is temporally eternal, then God can construct even infinite mathematical entities in finite time. The latter can be shown by invoking Grunbaum\u2019s solution to the problem of completing an infinite process in finite time (Grunbaum 1969).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Apart from mathematical objects, there are also abstract intentional entities whose mode of existence is also in need of clarification from the theistic perspective. One class of such entities are propositions \u2013 intentional contents bearing truth values expressible by sentences. Propositions are traditionally conceived as abstract entities which are not in space and time. Though such conception can plausibly explain how sentences in different languages can have the same content or meaning, there still remains a metaphysical question of how such intentional relations are obtained since abstract entities, traditionally, do not have causal powers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One possible solution to this puzzle would be to treat propositions as mental (psychological) entities and thus make them more tightly connected to linguistic ones than typical abstract objects are deemed to be. Under such interpretation, the problem of the independent existence of propositions from God does not occur because if human beings can create, sustain, and annihilate propositions then, surely, God can too, which in turn means that propositions are not independent from God.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regarding the problem of intentionality in context of non-existent objects, theists can argue that such entities are possibilities conceived by God, more precisely, conceived only in His propositional thinking but not realised as objects. For this argument to hold, appropriate adjustment would have to be made to the standard theistic conception according to which God does not have unactualized possibilities, i.e. that God is \u201cpure act\u201d. In addition to these adjustments, the argument will be constructed to the effect that creating the world by causing it to come to existence is a different kind of act from constructing \u201cdefinite procedures for creating mathematical entities\u201d. This argument will then be tested against a rival theory according to which the world is self-caused.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Topic 2: Relation Between Consciousness, Intentionality, and Reality in the Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Subtopic<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2.1: Intentionality, Self-Representation, and Naturalization. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Phenomenal consciousness is the property of certain mental states to have a specific subjective quality (Nagel 1974). One theory of phenomenal consciousness is the higher order theory, according to which a mental state is phenomenally conscious if it is represented by a higher-order mental state (Armstrong 1968, Rosenthal 1993, Carruthers 1996). This is in contrast with the first-order representationalism according to which a mental state is phenomenally conscious if it appropriately represents the environment (Tye 1995, Dretske 1993). Recently, there has been a renewal of interest in the work of Franz Brentano, and some authors have put forth a neo-Brentanian theory of consciousness, according to which a mental state is phenomenally conscious if it suitably represents itself (Thomasson 2000, Textor 2006, Kriegel 2003, 2004, 2009). This key role in this conception is played by Brentano\u2019s distinction between inner awareness and inner perception: the former is an attentive representation of the subject\u2019s mental state by a numerically distinct state; the latter, however, is a form of inattentive, incidental awareness of the subject\u2019s mental state realized by the very mental state in question (Brentano 1874).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The most detailed version of that kind of theory is found in works of Uriah Kriegel, who attempts to give a naturalistic self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness (Kriegel 2004). Kriegel postulates a number of criteria which the content of a mental state has to satisfy in order for it to be a self-representing state (the content has to be specific, non-derivative, and essential). However, it is doubtful whether the acquisition of such content is naturalistically explicable. Furthermore, a more general problem emerges for any naturalistically inclined neo-Brentanian account, and that is the difficulty of explaining the mechanism of content fixation. In the debate about mental representation, one of the crucial problems is the nature of mechanisms that explain why a particular mental state has a specific intentional content. Simple causal theories are inadequate because they cannot explain cases of misrepresentation (Aizawa 2017). A very influential attempt of solving this problem are the various teleological theories of mental content, which appeal to the biological concept of function (Dretske 1995, Millikan 1984, Neander 2006, Papineau 1984, Price 1998). According to that approach, mental content can be explained by reference to the biological processes of selection and adaptation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The concept of biological function is important in the context of mental representation because it seems that it can provide a naturalistic underpinning of the semantic nature of mental states, particularly the possibility of error. The core idea is that just as beliefs can be true or false, functions can be performed or not performed, and misrepresenting would just be the failure of performing a function that the mental state was selected for. There are two main teleological theories. According to the indicator semantics (or informational semantics) developed by Fred Dretske, mental state represents a state of affairs if it has the function of indicating, or carrying information, about that state of affairs (Dretske 1988, 1995). Consumer semantics, on the other hand, is primarily associated with the work of Ruth Garret Milikan (Milikan 1984, 1989), and it focuses on the environmental conditions which determine the usefulness of the organism’s behavioural response to stimuli which produce the representation. In all these theories, the interaction between an organism and its environment is what determines mental contents, so it is appropriate to think of them as complex causal theories. This creates a problem for self-representational theories because a mental state cannot causally interact with itself. Thus, it seems that the prospects for a naturalistic self-representational theory of consciousness are weak.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The aim of this research segment is to evaluate the attempts at building a naturalistic neo-Brentanian theory of consciousness, with focus on Kriegel\u2019s work. The specific questions guiding the research are the following: How is the self-representation relation fixed in a naturalistically acceptable way, since it seems that neither casual nor evolutionary mechanisms can play a role here? How does the metaphysical side of the neo-Brentanian account fare with respect to the phenomenology of conscious mental states? Can the attempts at reinterpreting the Brentanian view (e.g. Thomasson\u2019s adverbial account, in Thomasson 2000) solve the aforementioned problems?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The working hypothesis of this research segment is that neo-Brentanian approaches do not mesh well with a thoroughly naturalistic perspective on consciousness and intentionality, due to metaphysical problems in explaining self-representation in naturalistically acceptable terms. The goal will also be to evaluate the general prospects of informational approaches to those of consumer approaches in offering a detailed naturalistic picture of the mechanism by which intentional content is acquired, with the idea that informational approaches, due to their close relationship to sensory perception, offer a more promising route.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Subtopic 2.2: Hallucinations, Reality, and the Intentional Mind.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regarding the relation between intentionality and existence, the phenomenon of hallucination presents a challenge both for a philosophical theory of perception and for a philosophical theory of mind. One of the most interesting insights for coping with this challenge is that hallucinations needn\u2019t be regarded as cases of experiencing a non-existent object. If it can be convincingly shown that the object of hallucination misinforms and possibly also motivates the subject (to do or not to do things), then it is hard to see how such a misinforming and motivating object can be non-existent. Bearing this in mind, an initial hypothesis of this research segment is that hallucination is an experience of an unreal rather than of a non-existent object. This hypothesis rests on the basic ontological distinction between two types of existence: real and objective, the latter having the capability to (mis)inform and, possibly, to motivate a specific behaviour. The distinction is somewhat akin to the scholastic distinction between esse subiectivum<\/em> and esse obiectivum<\/em>, viz. between esse formale<\/em> and esse intentionale<\/em> (Spuit 1994\/1995;Macpherson and Batty 2016).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The research will focus on those hallucinatory experiences which are characterized by the hallucinator\u2019s partial or full insight into the unreal nature of the hallucinated object (as is typically the case with hallucinations caused by the Charles Bonnet syndrome (Pang 2026)). It is the hallucinator\u2019s bewilderment or astonishment at the weird mode of existence of hallucinated objects that will be of special interest. Namely, to the hallucinator, the object at the same time seems to exist and to not exist, misinforming the subject (or possibly also motivating, him\/her, however slightly, to behave in a specific way), whereby the hallucinated object reveals its presence to no one else but the hallucinator, and to just one of his\/her senses. The main source of evidence will be available hallucination reports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regarding this kind of hallucinations, the following two problems emerge: first, what are the experiential criteria for distinguishing between real and unreal objects (i.e. what determines whether an object will be felt as real or as unreal), and second, what does the experienced ontological ambiguity of hallucinated objects reveal about the cognitive and intentional structure of the mind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As to the first problem, the criteria for the experiential distinction between the real and the unreal have already been established (Aggernaes 1972, Farkas 2013), so the aim this research segment will be to establish how, if at all, the background experience of space \u2013 the space available to everybody’s motion and perception \u2013 affects our sense of reality, or unreality, of the hallucinated object(Bentall 1990; Garrett and Silva 2003; Dokic and Martin 2015; Drori et al. 2020).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As to the second problem, particular emphasis will be placed on the following three features of hallucinatory experiences (i.e. experiences characterized by the hallucinator\u2019s either partial or full insight into the unreality of the hallucinated object): first, the unreality of the hallucinatory object; second, the hallucinator\u2019s bewilderment and astonishment at the weird mode of existence of the hallucinated object; and, third, the fact that hallucinations misinform. The fact that the hallucinatory objects are unreal seems to reveal our mind\u2019s intentional openness both to the real and to the unreal. The hallucinator\u2019s bewilderment and astonishment at the weird mode of existence of the hallucinated object suggest that our mind spontaneously presumes objects of our experience to be real, for otherwise the subject would not be surprised (nor bewildered or astonished) after realizing that the hallucinated object is unreal. If both information and misinformation reduce uncertainty, then initially (i.e. before being confronted with any kind of object, whether real or unreal, capable of informing or disinforming) our mind is in a state of uncertainty. However, it is a qualified uncertainty (determined by questions like What? Where? When? Why? etc.) and not a mere emptiness (i.e. baren of any intentional directedness).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cautious analysis of this kind of hallucinations is expected to provide indirect insight into the intentional structure of the mind regarding its intentional openness to both real and unreal objects, its presumption of reality of experiential objects, and its initially specified uncertainties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Subtopic 2.3: Unconscious Intentionality.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unconscious mental states have always been a kind of embarrassment for theories of mind. The principal question that anybody tempted to posit such entities is faced with is: In what sense are they mental? Since the mentality attribute is typically reserved for states that are conscious, unconscious states should at least be intentional to count as mental. But in what sense are they intentional? This question has puzzled phenomenological and analytic philosophers alike (Gurwitsch 1966, Zahavi 2020, Searle 1989).<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

By answering the question (whatever answer one might choose), one commits oneself to one of the many possible views of the relation between the two crucial properties determining the ontological status of the mind: intentionality<\/em> and consciousness<\/em>. For instance, if one endorses some version of the cognitivist (representationalist) model of the mind \u2013 the view that neurophysiological (\u201cpurely syntactic\u201d) structures somehow embody semantic (representational) properties \u2013 one automatically assumes that due to these properties some \u201cpurely physical\u201d states or processes in our brains deserve to be classified as mental despite their being principally unavailable to introspection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Those who strongly oppose this view on the grounds of their radically different understanding of the relation between intentionality and consciousness, like J. Searle (1995) or G. Strawson (2004, 2005) put principal restrictions on the kinds of nonconscious entities one is justified to introduce into one\u2019s theory of mind. Thus, various types of the so-called cognitive unconscious \u2013 Fodor\u2019s language of thought, Marr\u2019s 2 \u00bd D perceptual rules, Chomsky\u2019s generative grammar, and similar representational structures that are postulated to account for the way we think, perceive, and behave (including our linguistic behavior) \u2013 are not suitable candidates since they are theoretical entities, principally inaccessible to consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Accepting this kind restriction leaves room only for those unconscious states that are, at least in principle, accessible to consciousness. However, if such states are to be admitted into one\u2019s mental ontology, it must be shown that they, despite being unconscious, possess some feature(s) peculiar to their conscious intentional counterparts (most notably \u201caspectual shape\u201d, a specific perspective or way of appearance \u2013 akin to the Fregean sense \u2013 in which an intentional object presents itself). In the absence of any plausible reports of unconscious perceptions, the prima facie candidates for satisfying this condition are the unconscious tokens of the customary folk-psychological types \u2013 beliefs, desires, regrets, expectations, hopes, etc. It is standardly assumed (and compatible with our ordinary linguistic practice) that propositionally expressible contents of such \u201cattitudinal\u201d states need not be consciously entertained for a state to retain its intentional, and thus mental, status. One way to cash-out this intuitive assumption is to invoke the dispositional analysis: to treat unconscious propositional attitudes as mental dispositions<\/em> which, under appropriate conditions, manifest themselves either in one\u2019s corresponding conscious (\u201coccurrent\u201d) states or in one\u2019s behavior (Crane 2017). One might have never consciously entertained the thought-content that, say, rain does not dissolve pedestrians\u2019 hats, but would immediately assent, if prompted to do so, to its propositional content, i.e. generate a consciously occurrent thought with that same content. This indicates that certain kinds of propositional items are somehow<\/em> mentally present \u2013 not necessarily individually \u201crepresented\u201d \u2013 even when not being consciously entertained. Moreover, this could be the case even if an individual item as such (i.e. in its specific intentional or propositional form) have never<\/em> been consciously entertained (and thus, presumably, have no memory traces, or a corresponding location in the brain\u2019s neural circuitry). And if this holds true of beliefs and belief-like states, it does not seem implausible to assume that it holds for (at least some) other propositional attitudes too.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the less bright side, allowing dispositional states with intentional properties into one\u2019s mental ontology generates several problems, the most obvious one being the proliferation of such entities \u2013 beyond what would seem tolerable for a plausible theory of mind. A way to avoid this problem would be to somehow distinguish the \u201creal\u201d or \u201cobvious\u201d or \u201crelevant\u201d unconscious thoughts from the rest of the virtually infinite set of merely potential states with propositional contents. Paradigmatic cases of the former are \u201cimplicit\u201d or \u201ctacit\u201d beliefs (Schwitzgebel 2021). Under one proposal (e.g. Dennett 1978), only those unconscious beliefs, of myriads of hypothetical candidates, should count as implicit whose propositional contents can be straightforwardly derived<\/em> from the propositional content of the corresponding occurrent (\u201cexplicit\u201d) judgement. However, the criterion of swift derivability has turned out as hopelessly vague and thus hardly useful for delimiting the realm of the intentionally unconscious, at least regarding attitudinal states. (Lycan 1986). There have been other attempts to distinguish those unconscious states\/contents that play an active, albeit \u201cimplicit\u201d, role in our mental economy (and influencing our behavior) from mere \u201ccognitive dispositions\u201d (Crimmings 1992) but they have not produced impressive results either. Some of these attempts were motivated by the so-called frame-problem<\/em> \u2013 an epistemological problem detected by AI researchers in the early 1970-ies and extensively discussed by philosophers in the 1980-ies and 1990-ies (Pylyshyn 1987). It is in essence the problem of applying the right (relevant) implicit beliefs in the right circumstances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The failure to find a tenable criterion for delimiting the sphere of the intentionally unconscious is rightly seen by some philosophers (Crane 2017) as a symptom of a mistaken conception of the unconscious intentional contents (especially beliefs) and of the nature of their relation to their conscious counterparts. Several revisionist accounts have been proposed by philosophers of mind (Kriegel 2017; Crane 2013, 2017; McGinn 2013) with the aim of showing how these accounts are able to deal better with several features of mental life (e.g. holistic nature of beliefs) of not only humans but other creatures too.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An apparently different approach to unconscious intentionality in philosophy of mind was offered by John Searle (1983, 1992) who distinguishes between the intentional \u201cNetwork\u201d and the nonintentional \u201cBackground\u201d, the two structural elements in relation to which the content of each conscious intentional state is supposed to determine its conditions of satisfaction. Being nonintentional and \u201cembodied\u201d (realized in our brains and bodies as wholes), the Background functions a kind of holistic and dynamic complement of the Network. Notwithstanding Searle\u2019s painstaking attempts to clarify his Network-cum<\/em>-Background theory and safeguard it against various misunderstandings (which he attributes to our inability to get rid of the \u201cinventory conception of the mind\u201d \u2013 the idea that propositional items are individually stored in, and retrieved from, a kind of representational storehouse), it still suffers from ambiguities which have prompted various criticisms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In its general philosophical motivation, Searle\u2019s approach to unconscious intentionality is compatible with the one that has become known (since the early 2000s) under the label \u201cembodied cognition\u201d (Shapiro 2012). Being inspired by very diverse influences: from phenomenological through Gibson\u2019s ecological psychology to non-symbolic AI, the embodied cognition research program promises to fill in the details left open by the much more general picture painted by philosophers like Searle. For instance, one of the concepts designed to replace the old version of cognitivism is the concept of extended cognition or wide computationalism (Clerk and Chalmers 1998). Reactions to such accounts, interestingly, echo the old concerns about the mental status of unconscious intentional states. More specifically, it is the absence of \u201cintrinsic\u201d or \u201cnon-derived\u201d intentional content that is seen as problematic for the extended cognition approach (Adams and Aizawa 2008).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Considering the here described efforts to understand intentionality as a feature of both conscious and unconscious states \u2013 from phenomenological to classical representationalist (e.g. in terms of dispositional beliefs) to revisionist (both in philosophy of mind and in the field of embodied cognition) accounts \u2013 the goal of this research segment will be to contrast and evaluate the offered solutions with regard to the nature of the intentional content<\/em> peculiar to unconscious states<\/em> of different folk-psychological types.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Topic 3: Intentionality in the Formal and Applied Logics. Subtopic<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3.1: Intentionality and Plurality of Logics.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since intentionality is a feature of our thoughts to be about<\/em> something, it is also called \u201caboutness\u201d (Yablo 2014). Logic, on the other hand, is considered a formal <\/em>discipline that studies valid reasoning and valid arguments. Even more, formality is taken to be one of the defining features of this discipline. Logic is formal in a sense that it is topic-neutral<\/em>. It focuses only on the form of valid arguments and disregards their content: valid arguments can be about plants, cars, or geometrical shapes. This puts logic in a peculiar position vis-\u00e0-vis intentionality. Given that valid arguments can be about anything, they can also be said to be about nothing<\/em> (in particular) \u2013 which could mean that logic lacks aboutness. A way to reclaim the intentionality of logic is to distinguish between different types and\/or grades of formality (Dutilh Novaes 2011, MacFarlane 2000). The prevailing view is the one according to which the contents of logic are the \u201clogical terms\u201d in some formal language, such as logical connectives\/operators of conjunction and negation (Tarski 1936). For instance, the logical truism \u201cIf p<\/em> and q<\/em>, then p<\/em>\u201d is saying that if sentence p<\/em> and sentence q<\/em> are the case, this implies that sentence p<\/em> is the case. The letters \u201cp<\/em>\u201d and \u201cq<\/em>\u201d can stand for any two sentences, but the logical connective \u201cand\u201d has a quite more determined meaning. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This research segment takes as its goal to explore the intentionality of logic and logical truths, while also taking into account another, seemingly unconnected phenomenon \u2013 the plurality of logics. There is more than one logic, and many among then are mutually conflicting. The \u201cregular\u201d of \u201cdefault\u201d way of doing logic is classical logic<\/em>, but some logical systems feature axioms and\/or theorems that go against this logic. Moreover, scholars often disagree about which is the correct logic for a particular phenomenon. A case in point is intuitionist logic, proposed by Brouwer (1975) as the correct logic for mathematics. Brouwer had a constructivist (as opposed to a realist) stance about mathematics. On his theory, mathematical truths become true only when they are constructed in the minds of individual mathematicians. This made him reject some of the fundamental principles of classical logic, like that of \u201cdouble negation elimination\u201d. On the other hand, many philosophers and mathematicians do not accept Brouwer\u2019s view, opting rather for a stance that mathematical truths are eternal and not dependent on what particular people do \u2013 which makes them accept classical logic as the logic of mathematics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This research will investigate the ramifications of such \u201clogical disagreements\u201d on the intentionality of logic. Given that logical terms have different definitions in different logics (e.g., classical vs. intuitionist negation), this research segment aims to explore if the plurality of logics implies the plurality of logical intentionalities. There seem to be two general options regarding this question. Firstly, the minds of \u201clogical opponents\u201d might be said to be directed toward different kinds of \u201clogical realities\u201d, which could mean that each logic has its own intentionality. On the other hand, it could be the case that there is only a single logical reality with a corresponding unique intentionality, and the plurality of logic may stem from the fact that this reality is mediated<\/em> in a plurality of ways. If so, this raises the further question about the kinds of mediators of logical aboutness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In exploring these issues, several insights of the Croatian philosopher Albert Bazala (1924, 1938, 1942) will also be taken into account. For Bazala, both logic and philosophy are rooted in the mystical<\/em> and dependent on the individual will. The research will investigate which of the two general options regarding the (possible) plurality of logical intentionalities is better supported by Bazala\u2019s philosophy of \u201cvoluntarist activism\u201d. Bazalian mythos could be a generator of multiple logical realities\/intentionalities, but it could, alternatively, be a personalized mediator through which individuals access a single and unique logical reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Subtopic 3.2: Intentionality and the Logic of Utterances.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Contemporary philosophical discussion on relationship or dependency between utterances, intentional states, and social character of communication, is usually presented along positions developed by authors such as John Searle and Daniel Vanderveken (Searle and Vanderveken 1985), on one hand, and Robert Brandom, on the other hand. More precisely, in the context of normative aspects of communication, Searle and Vanderveken argue in favour of illocutionary logic, according to which communicative commitments stem from sincerity conditions (commitments on intentional states of participants of communication). Brandom\u2019 s perspective of normative pragmatics (Brandom 1994) posits normativity as phenomenon sui generis<\/em>, according to which the normative structure of any discursive practice is the basic structure upon which the logic of locutions is built.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lesser known is the perspective of logical projectivism<\/em> (at first loosely labelled as the third stance), developed by a Croatian philosopher and logician Berislav \u017darni\u0107 (1959 \u2013 2017). Logical projectivism maintains that \u201cthe logic of utterances is the origin of all other logics used in describing psychological and social realities. […] The logic of utterances manifests itself in its meaning effects such as deontic or bouletic. It can be studied only in relation to deontic logic and logic of intentionality. Therefore, research in logic of imperative and other utterances must include investigation of relations between logics\u201d (\u017darni\u0107 2012).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to logical projectivism, language-in-use does not create its own logic, but displays it in the effects of language use, viz. commitments of rationality (psychological commitments) as well as linguistic ones (\u017darni\u0107 and Ba\u0161i\u0107 2017). \u017darni\u0107\u2019 s stance is carried out chiefly through his rich work on imperative and other non-declarative sentences (e.g. \u017darni\u0107 2003, 2011, 2012, 2013), as well as later works concerning argumentation theory (\u017darni\u0107 and Ba\u0161i\u0107 2017) Hallmark of these works is scepticism towards propositions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What remains to be investigated, as the goal of this research segment, is the amplification of this projectivist perspective within \u017darni\u0107\u2019s typology of normative systems. \u017darni\u0107\u2019s general study of normative systems (starting from \u017darni\u0107 2010a and 2010b, with \u017darni\u0107 and Ba\u0161i\u0107 2014 marking the beginning of his mature works), centered around problems of consistency of normative systems, in its later stages is characterised by employment of dialetheic logic (Priest 2006) in order to preserve the consistency of the system. This somewhat radical shift may be challenged on the basis of his own solutions provided by projectivist perspective in earlier works.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Topic 4: Propositional Content in the Early Analytic Philosophy.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The focus of this research segment is the emergence of the idea of propositional content in the early analytic philosophy (Frege, Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein: 1879\u20131921). How does this relate to the project about intentionality? For Frege, \u201csenses\u201d (including thoughts, i.e., propositions) are primary source of intentionality \u2013 other intentional entities (e.g., mental or linguistic ones) are such because the relation between them and their objects is mediated by a sense. Russell (and, to a certain extent, early Wittgenstein) rejected this picture, insisting that the relation between mental or linguistic entities is direct rather than mediated, so, to explain this relation, he introduced the category of \u201cfacts\u201d, equating facts with propositions. These disparate views about the nature of intentionality and propositions generated personal disputes between Frege and Russell, but also between Frege and the early Russellians. The dispute still dominates contemporary discussions about the nature of intentionality and the nature of content in both philosophy of language (semantics) and philosophy of mind (Fregean vs. Russellian propositions; internalism vs. externalism, etc.).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In his early writings (Frege 1879, 1884, 1885), Frege operated with a single semantic category of \u201ccontent\u201d, which he roughly equated, depending on the occasion, either with an object, a concept, or a \u201cjudgable content\u201d (composed of concepts and objects). By 1891, he abandoned the category of content, supplanting it with the sense\/meaning distinction. In his writings of the period (e.g., Frege 1891, 1892a, 1892b), the sense of a whole declarative sentence is equated with a thought it expresses, and its meaning with thought\u2019s truth-value (True or False). For Frege, both thoughts and truth-values are abstract, mind-independent entities, which are to be sharply separated from psychological entities \u2013 subjective \u201cideas\u201d. Thoughts are structured and composed of more elementary senses; all true thoughts represent the True, and the false ones the False; unlike, thoughts, truth-values are primitive. All sentences that express a true thought mean the same (namely, the True), and all sentences that express a false thought mean the same (namely, the False).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unlike Frege\u2019s category of sense that is intuitively appealing, his category of the meaning of a declarative sentence, which is equated with a truth-value, is deeply puzzling because, if conceived on the par with ordinary names (as Frege intended), one would expect of, say, true sentences to name certain facts or states of affairs in the world, as their truthmakers, rather than the peculiar entity called \u201cthe True\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The primary goal of this research segment will be to explain in detail Frege\u2019s motivation behind his proposal. The thesis that will be defended is that one of the main reasons for Frege\u2019s later rejection of judgable content, as well as states of affairs\/facts, stems from his early criticism of Mill. Frege, as I will argue, must have realised that the problems affecting Mill\u2019s \u201cheaps\u201dor \u201daggregates\u201d apply to his own category of judgable content. And the latter, being composed of concepts and objects, does not significantly differ from facts or states of affairs as intuitively conceived. For that reason, by 1891, these categories are not to be found in Frege\u2019s analysis. This is additionally supported by the fact that all arguments Frege offers for the thesis that truth-values are meanings of declarative sentences (Frege 1891, 1892a) equally support the thesis that states of affairs are such meanings. Thus, these arguments cannot explain his rejection of states of affairs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 1902, Frege engaged into correspondence with Russell who, influenced by Moore (1899), identified sentence meaning with propositions \u2013 extralinguistic entities composed of concepts and things, i.e., as facts\/states of affairs (Frege 1980, Russell 1903). At the same time, Russell defended the concept of class strongly resembling Mill\u2019s heaps and rejected Frege\u2019s non-psychological conception of thoughts as well as his sense\/meaning distinction in general. Therefore, the secondary goal of this research segment will be to analyse the Frege\/Russell dispute and show that Frege\u2019s criticism of Russell\u2019s classes and propositions appeals to the same arguments as his criticism of Mill.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As the third goal, argument will be offered in support of the thesis that the same line of thought undermines Frege\u2019s criticism of Mill, rejection of judgable content, introduction of truth-values, and rejection of Russell\u2019s concepts of class and proposition. These arguments will be provided by analysing Frege\u2019s subsequent criticism of the two Russellians \u2013 namely, \u201cearly\u201d early Wittgenstein (in the period 1911\u20131913) and Jourdain (in 1914), who both embraced and defended facts\/states of affairs (Frege 1979; Frege 1980; Geach 1977; McGuinness 2012, Wittgenstein 1979). Since the same line of argumentation is to be found in Frege\u2019s later criticism of the manuscript of Wittgenstein\u2019s Tractatus<\/em> in 1919 (Frege 2011), Frege\u2019s entire work on semantics (intentionality) can be considered as one \u201clong argument\u201d against facts which started with his criticism of Mill\u2019s heaps and persisted for the most of his career. In addition, as its fourth goal, this research segment will investigate early Wittgenstein\u2019s adaptation of Frege\u2019s and Russell\u2019s ideas from the perspective of Wittgenstein\u2019s idealist inclinations. Special attention will be dedicated to his concept of proposition, together with his appeal to psychological entities in logical explanations and his criticism of Frege\u2019s \u201cDer Gedanke\u201d (the article in which Frege offers the most detailed characterisation of thoughts). The postdoctoral researcher will focus on various aspects of early Wittgenstein\u2019s departure from Frege and Russell. Finally, as its fifth goal, the reception of Frege among Croatian philosophers will be considered, especially in Gajo Petrovi\u0107\u2019s Logic<\/em> (1964) where the author rejects psychologism and adopts a conception of judgement which strongly resembles Frege\u2019s thoughts.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Intentionality and Modes of Existence Historical Framework. If one would have to name a single concept peculiar to contemporary theoretical philosophy, intentionality would be a good, if not the best, choice. Despite looming large (typically under the label \u2018representation\u2019) in many other disciplines and fields of study \u2013 from psychology and linguistics to anthropology, sociology, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-45","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/imex.ifzg.hr\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/45","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/imex.ifzg.hr\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/imex.ifzg.hr\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/imex.ifzg.hr\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/imex.ifzg.hr\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=45"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/imex.ifzg.hr\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/45\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":48,"href":"https:\/\/imex.ifzg.hr\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/45\/revisions\/48"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/imex.ifzg.hr\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=45"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}